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proposals for reform was not entirely misconceived. Had not the lack of public spirit on the part of the ecclesiastical establishment served to quash any hopes Bentham had for his cherished Panopticon-a circular prison in which to "grind rogues honest"? (Works, X, 226)10 Were not the Bishops the ones who watered down the Unitarian Toleration Bill in 1813,1 who helped to delay the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, and who threw their weight behind the government whenever the tide of seditious, libellous, or blasphemous literature seemed to threaten the traditional order of society?12 But for all we can contrive to say on behalf of Bentham's radical campaign against the Anglican Establishment, we are hard pressed to stay at his side when he turns his attentions to religious beliefs. The discussions of life after death, the Scriptures, miracles, Christian asceticism, the nature of the soul, and the existence of God in the Analysis and Not Paul, But Jesus all leave one cold.13 Bentham could not countenance any common ground between the spiritual world of religion and the perceptible world of physical experience; they are, he believed, mutually exclusive worlds. Indeed, in taking his stand on the apparently solid ground of the latter, he confidently declared the nonexistence of the former. All his tools of analysis, his logic, the presuppositions of his nominalist metaphysics, and his descriptive theory of language, 4 served to convince him beyond any shadow of doubt that the an outright denial of the truth of religion, of the existence of an immortal soul, of a future life, and of the existence of God. 16 Bentham never in so many words publicly avowed his atheism; he was much too cautious to do this.17 But that he was an atheist in substance there can be no doubt. His destructive criticisms of religious doctrine left no residue that could be of any value. To his one-time amanuensis John Colls, Bentham was that "hoary headed infidel" who made tasteless jokes at the expense of Abraham and who viewed death merely as the "altering the modification of matter" (which Colls thought an appropriate notion for an atheist).18 Bentham's friend and admirer, John Quincy Adams, too, had no doubts about his unbelief:
The general tenor of his observations ... was to discredit all religion, and he intimated doubts of the existence of a God. His position was, that all human knowledge was either positive or inferential; that all inferential knowledge was imperfect and uncertain, depending upon a process of the human mind which could not in its nature, be conclusive; that our knowledge of the physical world was positive, while that of a Creator of it was inferential; that God was neither seen nor felt, nor in any manner manifested to our senses, but was the deduction from a syllogism, a mere probability from the combinations of human reason; that of the present existence of matter we have positive knowledge; that there was a time when it did not exist we assume without proof, for the purpose of assuming equally without proof, an eternal Creator of it.19 This is a concise statement of Bentham's secular positivism, but it is also important to note the conviction with which his unbelief is stated. Duncan Howlett, in his history of the "critical way" in religion, has pointed it out as a persistent defect in the religious person's perception of the atheist that he fails "to see how deeply the so-called unbeliever believes;... to recognize that he is an unbeliever because of his positive beliefs." It is on the basis of these "positive beliefs" that the unbeliever repudiates the concept of miracles and that he can find no evidence that divine intervention occurs in the world. At the heart of the confidence with which Bentham condemned religion was the scientific framework of his view of the world. To this source can also be traced his failure to comprehend the inner spirit which motivates the truly religious person. Surely was it not the height of injustice for Bentham to suppose that philanthropists inspired by religious beliefs, like the saintly penal reformer John Howard (1726-90) and the anti-slave trader William Wilberforce (1759-1853), tried to do good in the world simply from fear of Hell and hope of Heaven? He never really understood the distinction between reasoning, which is based on knowledge and experience, and faith, which involves the total personality in submission to the highest ideal. This is not to say that there is no "reasoning" to be done in religion or theology. It is only to mark the differences between the kinds of reasoning that one expects in the realm of science, on the one hand, and in religion, on the other. But what is clear is that the "reasons" for one's religious beliefs are not and cannot be given in terms of scientific proofs or rational demonstration; ultimately all comes back to faith. When we discuss religious matters, therefore, we must seek less for rational demonstration than for "evidences" of their The kingdom of heaven is within us. That which is the substance of religion, its hopes and consolation, its intermixture with the thoughts by day and by night, the devotion of the heart, the control of appetite, the steady direction of the will to the commands of God, is necessarily invisible. Yet upon these depend the virtue and the happiness of millions.23
Bentham's utilitarianism with its materialist and nominalist underpinnings could not encompass the "internal" and "mysterious" and this impoverished his analysis. At the very point where he touched upon man's spiritual nature in his "Essay On Logic," he halted the examination. Following Descartes he divided man in the first instance into "corporeal" and "incorporeal" substances, but unlike Descartes he denied that the mental was more certain than the corporeal. Accordingly, he only continued the analysis on the physiological side of the division, and this is a tacit avowal of the limitations of his "science of man" (Works, VIII, 253). Whatever cannot be reduced to discrete and concrete entities, he claims, does not exist; but this, in his sense of it, is a tautological statement. Not surprisingly, the belief that human beings do not have a spiritual nature fosters a science unable to deal with deep inner feelings and personality. But it is certainly false logic subsequently to employ this science, as Bentham did, to "prove" that the belief in man's spiritual nature is unfounded or that the god he worships does not exist.24 Bentham's unbelief owes a debt, too, to the French Enlightenment. His vehement and ironic language when disparaging religion is reminiscent of that used by Voltaire, Helvetius, and Holbach in their condemnations of French clerics and their religious doctrines. Like the philosophes, too, Bentham argued that he must destroy in order to build, and he often followed them in using metaphors of aggression to dramatize his destructive activities.25 Voltaire used to say, "I'm tired of being told While we may safely assume Bentham's abhorrence for philosophies of this nature, it is noteworthy that he shared with Comte certain peculiarities of character and thought.33 Both men possessed an irresistible urge to build a "system" in which every discipline and science was to find its place and also to account for all aspects of social, political, and intellectual life. The character of their respective utopias was to be dic- 31 The comparison made by Michael Oakeshott in "The New Bentham" goes too far in asserting that Bentham was a philosophe rather than a philosopher, a man with belief in "encyclopedic knowledge," "remarkable for his general credulity," who "begins with a whole miscellany of presuppositions which he has neither the time, the inclination nor the ability to examine." He has little in common with the philosopher: "For the philosophe the world is divided between those who agree with him and "fools"; "science" is contrasted with superstition and superstition is identified with whatever is established, generally believed or merely felt. were all suggestions he made at one time or another for employing the clergy and religious institutions for secular purposes. Bentham seems to have believed that the sentiments men attached to these persons and institutions were mistakenly understood to be religious in character and that their transposition to a secular context, therefore, was simply the recovery of their true character and use. The main thrust of his later thought on the role of religion, however, went much further than merely to suggest ways of employing religious institutions for secular purposes. In the ideal secularized world all traces of religious sentiment would be banished; it was to be the first duty of the legislator to do all in his power to eliminate religious beliefs.
Bentham's advice "To obey punctually; to censure freely"-given in his A Fragment On Government (1776) at the outset of his career-was a maxim always to be followed save where sober calculation showed a clear advantage to be had by disobedience. It is plain that Bentham's attitude to religion was much the same as his attitude to political and legal institutions: it was a public service which, because of the vested interest of its functionaries in sustaining it in a corrupt condition, was in need of a complete overhaul. The difference, however, was that whereas the reformed political and legal institutions would still be an essential feature of the Utilitarian society, Bentham came to believe that even if disestablished, religion would still be an enemy to human happiness, due to the doctrines and beliefs it expounded. To reform the Established Church was not to reform its teachings. It was not sufficient merely to blunt the harmful political effects of religion; as long as religious beliefs constituted an active spring of human action, the rational, that is the temporal, pursuit of self-interest would be thwarted. Irrespective of the additional problems presented by established religion, while men are still influenced by religious beliefs to forego the pleasures of this life, political coercion, direct and indirect, will be necessary. And, as one commentator has said, this means that "the enlightened state will be in the paradoxical position of 'forcing men to be happy' and will therefore refute a purely utilitarian justification for political What are we to make of all this? In the first place, it is obvious that Bentham found it almost impossible to divorce his train of thought from the practices of conventional religion. Yet he maintained the difference: in his secular observances no spiritual content is to be found. In the secular Utilitarian society there was to be no God, and the idea of an immortal soul was to be banished from discourse. Men lived on only through their achievements and their presence as ideas in the minds of the men who came after them. There being no supernatural sanction for morality, a man's reward for his contributions to the public good is to be remembered affectionately by his family and to be commemorated by his fellow citizens. Religious rewards and punishments in a future life are replaced by the verdict of future generations, a verdict which is renewed century after century in the case of great men.
It is at this point that the affinity between Bentham and his French contemporaries, revolutionary and philosophical, ends. His desire to eliminate the idea of religion, to the end of constructing a new society unhampered my myth, contrasts with the efforts of the French, particularly Comte, to construct a secular equivalent to Christian belief and practicea secular "religion of humanity" stripped of otherworldly referents. In the Utilitarian society men are bound to each other by the ordinary arrangements of the state and by the knowledge that ultimately their own happiness is dependent upon the actions of others. The only notion of common faith they share is belief in utility and in man's ability to build a new society free from the superstitions with which the old order was fraught. There is to be no Comtean Positivist priesthood, no modes of private or public worship, no religious signs or symbols, however devoid of mysticism they might appear, no idolization of the feminine virtues, and no "Great Being" or "Goddess" for men to contemplate.49 any sense of man's incorporeal nature, religious or otherwise, and lacking, too, John Stuart Mill's profound understanding of the capacity of human beings for self-development. Bentham concluded that "Sense, which is the basis of every idea, is so of every enjoyment; and unless man's whole nature be new modelled, so long as man remains man the stock of sense ... never can increase."51 Man, as a "bundle of sensations," will always remain just that, and this meant that in the Utilitarian utopia the onus to achieve reform lies with the legislator; he it is who must contrive to manipulate and coerce men into conformity with the dictates of utility. Insofar as he succeeds in this task the stock of happiness will be increased, and insofar as he fails it will be diminished. There is nothing inherent in human nature that can save it from this ignoble dependence; pain and suffering are part and parcel of the inhabited world, and all attempts to transcend this reality are chimerical. What progress there is to be had is to be had by altering the social and political arrangements, which must be stripped of all superstitious and mystical elements and all other impediments to the task of maximizing utility. Such a functional utopia is characterized by adequacy and efficiency; however, as J. S. Mill and other critics have remarked, Bentham's utopia, spiritually and emotionally impoverished, could never rise to the level of magnificence.
The poverty of Bentham's vision is, of course, firmly rooted in his social science and specifically in his understanding of human nature, but we should not doubt the strength of his commitment to its creation. His aim was to construct the Utilitarian utopia according to the principles of his exhaustive legislatorial system. Free from all taint of religion it was toward this end that "the sect of the utilitarians," the works of their great "founder" in hand, were to devote all their efforts.
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